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Chance and Necessity in History: E.H. Carr and Leon 
Trotsky Compared 
Ann Talbot ∗ 
Abstract: »Zufall und Notwendigkeit in der Geschichte: E. H. Carr und Leon 
Trotsky im Vergleich«. It was E.H. Carr who dismissed counterfactual history 
or the “might-have-been” school of history as a “parlour game” in What is His-
tory? Carr’s rejection of counterfactual history was a response to Isaiah Ber-
lin’s criticism of those who believed in the “vast impersonal forces” of history 
rather than giving priority to the role of the individual and the accidental. For 
Berlin, Carr was following in the footsteps of Hegel and Marx in regarding his-
tory as process that was determined and governed by necessity rather than 
chance. While the influence of both Hegel and Marx can be seen in Carr’s 
work, this article will argue that Carr’s approach to history is distinct from that 
to be found in classical Marxism as exemplified by Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, 
Labriola and Trotsky who always accepted the role of chance in history. It 
compares Carr’s historical method to that employed by Trotsky in his History 
of the Russian Revolution. 
Keywords: counterfactual, chance, necessity, E.H. Carr, Leon Trotsky, Isaiah 
Berlin, Marxism. 
Counterfactual history or the “might-have-been” school of history, E.H. Carr 
declared to be a “parlour game” which was unworthy of a real historian. As far 
as Carr was concerned the task of the historian was to write about what hap-
pened not about what might have happened. History, for Carr, was a study of 
causes and to suggest that something other than what happened might have 
happened was to violate this cardinal principle of the discipline. For this reason 
he has often been accused of being a determinist who underestimated the role 
of the accidental in history. It was a perceived failing for which Isaiah Berlin 
took him to task. The dispute between Carr and Berlin is the subtext of Carr’s 
book What is History? in which he sets out his philosophy of history and dis-
misses the validity of counterfactuals. (Carr 1990) 
The book was in large measure a reply to Berlin’s essay Historical Inevita-
bility in which he had criticized those who believed in the “vast impersonal 
forces” of history rather than giving priority to the role of the individual and the 
accidental. (Berlin 1997) Berlin maintained that those who regarded history as 
a determined causal chain, in the manner of Hegel or Marx, denied the role of 
free will and the individual responsibility of history’s tyrants for the crimes 
they committed. Both Carr and Berlin wrote with sparkling wit, but their dis-
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pute concerned issues of pressing intellectual and political importance, since 
this was the height of the Cold War. What was at issue was Britain’s attitude to 
the Soviet Union and its place in a putative nuclear war. The counterfactuals 
that Carr had in mind were those that suggested that some other outcome had 
been possible in Russia, that the 1917 Revolution was not inevitable, that the 
Bolsheviks might not have come to power and that instead the Provisional 
Government might have succeeded in maintaining its grip on events and man-
aged to establish a parliamentary system.  
An ideological dispute of this kind is so very un-British that there is not 
even a satisfactory English word for it, so I will use the German word. What 
we have here is a very British Historikerstreit. It was a dispute conducted in the 
most gentlemanly, oblique and mediated of terms and both sides were more 
likely to appeal to the commonsense of the average Times reader than high 
theory, but a Historikerstreit it was nonetheless. The national peculiarities of 
the time and class should not lead us to suppose that theoretical questions were 
not involved any more than we should suppose that political questions were not 
involved simply because they remained for the most part unstated. 
The principle theoretical question that emerges from the dispute between 
Carr and Berlin is the role of chance and necessity in history which is what I 
propose to discuss in this article. If, like Berlin, one attributes a predominant 
role to chance in history then it is always possible to argue that events might 
have taken a different course if only circumstances had been slightly different 
and counterfactuals can play an important role. If, like Carr, the historian em-
phasizes the role of necessity in history, then events could not have taken an 
alternative course, counterfactuals play no role, since events were determined 
and inevitable. In writing on the relationship between chance and necessity 
Carr, the great historian of the twentieth century turned to one of the great 
actors in twentieth century history – Leon Trotsky. He is, in a sense, a third 
participant in the Carr-Berlin Historikerstreit. 
As a child in St Petersburg, Berlin witnessed the Russian revolution that 
Trotsky led and which Carr encountered as a temporary clerk on the Northern 
desk at the Foreign Office. This key event of the twentieth century made Berlin 
and his family exiles and it ultimately made Carr into the historian we know 
rather than a minor diplomat. It is their different approaches to this event as 
historians that will figure in this article. Berlin admits counterfactuals and the 
role of the accidental in history but not determinism, Carr is a determinist who 
rejects the accidental as a factor in historical causality while Trotsky, who was 
a not inconsiderable historian himself, is a determinist who nonetheless admits 
counterfactuals.  
Both Carr and Trotsky saw the Russian revolution as an event that was his-
torically determined. Where they differed was in the role that each accorded to 
chance or accident. Carr’s History of Soviet Russia is peppered with references 
to Trotsky, often approving, and in many respects his analysis of the revolution 
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agrees with that of Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution. Carr liked to 
quote A.L Rowse’s remark that the difference between Sir Winston Churchill’s 
book about the First World War, The World Crisis, and Trotsky’s History of 
the Russian Revolution was that Churchill’s book had “no philosophy of his-
tory behind it”. (Carr 1990, 20) The idea that one might need a philosophy of 
history was something of a novelty in Britain at that time and Carr, who was 
influenced by the British Hegelian R.G. Collingwood, played a significant role 
in raising the intellectual level of historical studies in Britain. His influence on 
students was, on the whole, probably greater than that of Collingwood. 
Carr was not a Marxist, but the infusion of Hegelianism from Collingwood 
perhaps predisposed him to think in dialectical terms, and he was sufficiently 
impressed by the events of the twentieth century to see economics as, in the 
final analysis, determinant. He famously wrote “There is a sense in which we 
are all Marxists now. We all seek to explain political history in terms of the 
underlying economic realities.” (Haslam 1999, 54) For many people that would 
be enough to identify Carr as a Marxist and certainly for many of his critics, 
taken with his admirably objective History of Soviet Russia, it was sufficient 
evidence to condemn him. But I would argue that it is the difference between 
Carr’s understanding of chance and Trotsky’s attitude to chance that demon-
strates the difference between Carr’s economic determinism and Marxism. 
The passage from Trotsky that Carr cited in What is History? when he was 
discussing the role of chance runs as follows:  
The entire historical process is a refraction of historical law through the acci-
dental. In the language of biology, we might say that the historical law is rea-
lized through the natural selection of accidents. (Trotsky 1971, 515) 
It was a theory that Carr professed to find “unsatisfying and unconvincing.” 
(Carr 1990, 102) Accidents happened and could not be ignored by the historian, 
but they did not enter into the significant hierarchy of causes for Carr. 
Trotsky’s comment is a revealing statement about the historical method that 
he habitually employed. It comes in the middle of a discussion about the devel-
oping conflict during 1923 between Trotsky on the one side and Stalin, Zino-
viev and Kamenev on the other, and is followed by an account of Trotsky’s 
hunting trips. This is, incidentally a wonderful example of Trotsky’s literary 
ability, demonstrating both his capacity to depict the Russian landscape and to 
sketch brilliant character studies. But he had a purpose in making this digres-
sion. His intention was to explain the accident that excluded him from the 
discussions that took place in the leadership of the Bolshevik Party during the 
autumn and winter of 1923/4. After a night spent waiting in the marshes for 
wild duck he stepped out of his tent still wearing his felt boots and into the icy 
water, soaking his feet and giving himself a chill and an illness that was to last 
for months. “One can foresee a revolution or a war,” wrote Trotsky, “but it is 
impossible to foresee the consequences of an autumn shooting-trip for wild 
ducks.” (Trotsky 1971, 519) 
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This is not the only occasion on which Trotsky writes about the role of the 
accidental in history. Discussing the emergence of Kornilov’s insurrection in 
his History of the Russian Revolution he writes: “An accident occurred, which 
like all historic accidents opened the sluice-gates of necessity.” (Trotsky 1977, 
715) Trotsky’s comments point to an aspect of Marxism that is often over-
looked. The accidental, the contingent and the individual are often thought to 
have no role in historical materialism because it is deterministic, but in writing 
about accident in this way Trotsky was working within a tradition of classical 
Marxism that can be traced from Marx and Engels, to Labriola and Plekhanov. 
History would “be of a very mystical nature, if ‘accidents’ played no part,” 
Marx wrote. “These accidents naturally form part of the general course of 
development and are compensated by other accidents. But acceleration and 
delay are very much dependent on such ‘accidents,’ including the ‘accident’ of 
the character of the people who first head the movement.” (Marx and Engels 
1965, 319-20). 
Engels, in the well known letter to Bloch, writes of an “endless host of acci-
dents (that is of things and events whose inner interconnection is so remote or 
so impossible of proof that we can regard it as non-existent, as negligible)…” 
through which the necessary economic tendencies are finally asserted. (Marx 
and Engels 1965, 498). 
Labriola rejected schematic theories of history and insisted that “History has 
always received a definite form, with an infinite number of accidents and varia-
tions.” (Labriola 2005, 233). 
Plekhanov takes issue with what he calls “fatalist” historians who maintain 
that history is determined by general causes and that accidents play no role. He 
cites Pascal’s remark that history would have been different if Cleopatra’s nose 
had been shorter. Carr uses the same example in What is History? and puts 
Trotsky’s duck hunting accident into the same category as Cleopatra’s nose. 
(Carr 1990, 98) Both, he maintains, are not so much examples of chance as of 
phenomena that are caused by chains of events that are not in the historian’s 
hierarchy of causes. But Plekhanov does not dismiss the case of Cleopatra’s 
nose so readily and, in a discussion of the Seven Years War, demonstrates that 
accidents played a role within the parameters determined by the socio-political 
conditions of Europe at that time. 
Plekhanov cites Hegel on the role of the fortuitous or accidental. “In every-
thing finite there are accidental elements.” Accidents he insists are something 
relative and appear “only at the point of intersection of inevitable processes.” 
(Plekhanov 1961, 305) 
It is this dynamic inter-relationship between accident and necessity, between 
the inevitable process and the fortuitous incident where determined processes 
intersect, that characterizes Trotsky’s historical method and which distin-
guishes it from Carr’s method. Baruch Knei-Paz has drawn attention to the way 
in which Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution resolves some of the 
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central enigmas of history in general and of the history of revolution in particu-
lar. “Trotsky,” writes Knei-Paz, “continuously confronts the problem of the 
personal element as against the social, the accidental as against the pre-
designed and, in terms of drama, manages to convince, not by theorizing on the 
relative importance of each but by relating the one to the other.” (Knei-Paz 
1976, 506). 
What he is referring to is precisely those points that Plekhanov writes of at 
which inevitable processes collide. Trotsky explains that in writing the History 
of the Russian Revolution he identified four processes which 
…conditioned by the social structure of the country formed the background of 
the whole narrative: the evolution of the consciousness of the proletariat from 
February to October; the change of the moods in the army; a growth of pea-
sant vindictiveness; the awakening and insurgence of the oppressed nationali-
ties. (Trotsky 1972, 184). 
Elsewhere he writes of “Two causalities [which] moved toward each other 
at an angle and, at a certain moment, they came into hostile conflict.” (Trotsky 
1973, 363). 
In passing, I should say here that when Trotsky speaks about numerous cau-
salities he is not referring to the theory of causality by multiple factors, which 
was highly influential in Russia at the time of the revolution thanks to the work 
of N.K. Mikhailovsky (Billington 1958) and probably still represents one of the 
most common views of historical causality. Trotsky was certainly influenced 
by the theory of factors as a young man, but developed a powerful critique of it 
after reading Labriola in prison which is expressed in his History of the Russian 
Revolution. In a later work, Trotsky explains that there is necessarily an arbi-
trary character to these more or less self-contained factors because they do not 
arise from the material conditions of society. They are rather imposed on the 
facts from above. (Trotsky 1981, 391-409) Trotsky’s multiple causalities are 
always materially and historically determined. 
It is precisely the interaction of the four processes which Trotsky identifies 
that gives rise to moments of chance in the course of the Russian revolution 
whose outcome cannot be adequately predicted in advance. The historian who 
studies these events in retrospect must admit the possibility of an alternative or 
counterfactual course of events at these moments of collision between different 
causalities and hence, in some cases, of the outcome of the entire revolution. 
Knei-Paz draws attention to the way in which Trotsky captures the uncertainty 
of crucial moments in the revolution as when the crowd confronts the ranks of 
soldiers and the loyalty of the army wavers. The dramatic force of the descrip-
tion lies in the fact that the confrontation could just as easily go either way. The 
confrontation is determined, but the outcome is not. 
This is more than a literary device. Other historians such as Alexander 
Rabinowitch have drawn attention to this dramatic uncertainty in the events of 
the revolution. (Rabinowitch 1979) Carr himself is sensitive to it in practice, 
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despite his own theoretical misgivings about it. But where Carr and many other 
historians cease to be sensitive to the role of chance is in relation to the subse-
quent revolutionary situations that emerged during the twentieth century and 
did not result in a successful revolution. 
There is an element of fatalism in this that is not consistent with the histo-
rian’s task. The historian who gives due weight to both chance and necessity 
must inevitably consider the counterfactual possibilities. I do not wish to sug-
gest that many narratives are all equally possible and equally valid in the man-
ner of post-modernism. The historian’s counterfactuals cannot be simply a 
matter of wishful thinking or fancy. They have to be securely rooted in the 
material conditions of the society in question, as Trotsky’s certainly were. Carr 
dismissed the possibility of revolution in the West, but leading statesmen took 
Trotsky and the threat of revolution which he embodied seriously even when he 
was in exile. It is ironic that the politician who considers the counterfactual 
possibilities inherent in a situation tends to be considered a wise statesman 
while the historian who dismisses those same counterfactuals after the event 
tends to be regarded as a sober judge of evidence. The counterfactual may not 
have become actual, but that may be due to actions taken by historical actors 
who were conscious of the possibility that it might. The historian who attempts 
to understand the twentieth century should reflect the possibility of revolution. 
Not to do so is to fail to reflect the temper of the times. What we are left with if 
we remove the counterfactual from history is a vision of history as an abstract 
impersonal force rather than as a living process. “Let us not forget that revolu-
tions are accomplished through people,” Trotsky reminds his readers, “al-
though they be nameless. Materialism does not ignore the feeling, thinking and 
acting man, but explains him. What else is the task of the historian?” (Trotsky 
1977, 511)  
Berlin was in that sense correct when he accused Carr of elevating “vast im-
personal forces” at the expense of chance and the role of the individual. But 
Berlin’s conception of chance is not historically grounded. Trotsky’s concep-
tion of chance was of the unpredictable event that emerged from the collision 
of two or more historically determined causalities. Berlin’s, by contrast, was 
the product of the individual will and was intensely voluntaristic, harking back 
to the German Romantics he admired so much. Berlin allowed chance a sweep-
ing field of operation.  
Carr, on the other hand, was uncomfortable with chance. He admitted it 
rather begrudgingly because he accepted that there were inevitably many facts 
of which the historian must remain ignorant. In this his attitude was a very 
Humean one and quite distinct from the approach to chance that classical 
Marxism derived from Hegel. As far as Hume was concerned chance did not 
really exist or only existed in a subjective sense. In Hume’s philosophy chance 
is merely the term that we apply to a phenomena when we are ignorant of its 
causes. This is not the case in Hegel’s method. Hegel’s understanding of 
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chance is more closely related to that of Aristotle who distinguished between 
the potential (dunamai) and the actual (energeai). (Inwood 1992, 197) When 
Trotsky, Plekhanov, Labriola or Marx speak of chance it is in this sense of 
“potential” rather than in the Humean sense of something whose causes are 
unknown. Isaac Deutscher, who collaborated with Carr over many years, 
pointed to this empirical foundation of his friend’s thought: 
It is very difficult, or perhaps impossible for him to get out of his skin, theo-
retically and ideologically. He is steeped in English empiricism and rational-
ism, his mind is very far from what to him are abstract dialectical specula-
tions, and so he cannot really break down the barrier between his own way of 
thinking and Marxism. (Haslam 1999, 140) 
Yet instinctively and against his own better judgement Carr often arrived at 
very similar conclusions to Trotsky – this was particularly so in his conception 
of the Russian revolution as a mass action that was the result of fundamental 
causes that undermined both the Tsarist regime and the Provisional Govern-
ment. He maintained that “the Bolsheviks succeeded to a vacant throne” (Carr 
1966, 36) Carr may not have agreed with Trotsky on the counterfactual, but he 
never doubted his historical stature and that the revolution he led had been the 
result of changes in the consciousness of millions of people. His approach to 
the Russian revolution is immensely objective. He was the distinguished fore-
runner of a whole cohort of historians who began to subject the events and 
ideas of the Russian revolution to critical examination in the course of the 
1960s and 70s. Like Carr, all serious scholars then recognised Trotsky’s impor-
tance as a historical and intellectual figure. This is less so today. Carr’s ap-
proach to Trotsky is far more objective than that to be found in recent biogra-
phies such as those by Dmitri Volkogonov, (Volkogonov 1996) Geoffrey 
Swain (Swain 2006) and Ian Thatcher (Thatcher 2003). As a recent reviewer 
remarked “When one turns to the texts now being presented to students, it 
becomes immediately apparent that we are living in a very different – and far 
less healthy – intellectual environment ” than the one that existed then. (North 
2007, 13). 
In the years since Carr wrote his seminal history of the Soviet Union his ob-
jectivity has become the exception not the rule among historians and it is now 
common to view the Russian revolution as the work of few conspirators. To get 
a measure of the change that has taken place it is instructive to contrast two 
reviews by Richard Pipes. The first is a review of Carr’s History of the Soviet 
Union that he wrote in the American Historical Review in 1966 in which Pipes 
declared that there was “no history of Soviet foreign policy in the 1920s that 
can remotely compare with Carr’s treatment as far as factual coverage is con-
cerned.” Carr, he said, was “a one-man encyclopaedia.” (Haslam 1999, 248) 
Some thirty years later Pipes had changed his opinion. In a review of Jonathan 
Haslam’s biography of Carr for the Times dated September 10, 1999 and enti-
tled “A Very Cold Fish” Pipes announced that “A History of Soviet Russia … 
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remains … largely unread, even by specialists”. The book is flawed, Pipes 
claimed, because Carr had a “cold, self-centred personality,” and “took no 
interest in human beings: indeed, he was something of a misanthrope.” Pipes 
was particularly offended that when he encountered Carr in the “Professors’ 
Hall” of the Lenin Library the older man did not spring to his feet and embrace 
him. This alleged personal coldness was the “fatal flaw that robbed Carr’s 
historical writings of both insight and readability.”  
Pipes’s review was an extraordinary ad hominem attack on a man who could 
no longer defend his reputation, but it accurately reflected the way in which the 
prevailing standards of scholarship had changed. Berlin would never have 
written in this manner because both Berlin and Carr shared the assumption that 
history had a certain objective basis and was not simply a matter of subjective 
opinion. Their debate over the role of determinism, chance and counterfactuals 
took place within this context. It is an outlook that many historians no longer 
share. History is widely understood to be an entirely subjective narrative of 
past events with no significant objective basis in facts that are distinct from the 
historian’s own point of view. The writing of history is therefore no longer a 
study of causality as it was for Carr, but is determined by the psychological 
propensities of the historian. Historical debate does not need to consider differ-
ing philosophies of history since it is simply a question of identifying those 
psychological characteristics, quirks and flaws in an opponent that have shaped 
the narrative. Carr’s distinctive analysis of the causes of the Russian revolution 
can be dismissed because of his alleged psychological flaws. 
Pipes’s character assassination did not go unanswered. One of Carr’s former 
students replied in a letter to the Times on 17 September objecting to this “ill 
natured review” which he wrote “demonstrates that in the field of Soviet stud-
ies the Cold War is not yet over.” Pipes’s review was suffused with the trium-
phalism that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. What, wondered Pipes, 
would Carr have done if he had lived long enough to see that collapse? The 
answer to that is very simple. As a good historian Carr would have buried 
himself in the documents that were becoming available and assiduously worked 
through them in an attempt to discover the reason why the Soviet Union had 
collapsed. With his customary objectivity, he might well have ended by con-
cluding a final volume of his epic history by agreeing with Trotsky that the 
reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union was that the bureaucrat had de-
voured the workers’ state before the working class had dealt with the bureau-
crat. (Trotsky 1991, 243) Whatever the shortcomings of his philosophy of 
history, Carr’s History stands head and shoulders above that of many current 
works and a vitality which they lack. It undoubtedly represents a highpoint of 
historical scholarship. 
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